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[1695] 
Miranda Overseas:  
The Law of Coerced Confessions Abroad 
David Keenan* 
In recent years, Article III courts have become the preferred venue for the U.S. 
government to try terrorism suspects captured abroad. Many liberals have welcomed this 
development, characterizing it as a proper extension of American rule of law principles to 
the so-called “War on Terror.” But while many have celebrated the marginalization of 
the military tribunal system, few have directly acknowledged its potential costs. 
 
This Article examines one of those costs: Reduced procedural safeguards for Article III 
defendants against statements procured through coercive interrogation techniques. As 
courts have repeatedly recognized, the core purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause is to ensure that the accused is not compelled to testify against 
himself in a criminal proceeding. More controversially, Miranda warnings give effect to 
that purpose by requiring that any statements admitted into evidence be the product of a 
suspect’s voluntary and informed choice. 
 
However, where matters of national security are implicated, there is a danger that 
prosecutions of extraterritorial crimes will cause our domestic courts to bend or abandon 
traditional rules of American criminal procedure. That is particularly true with respect to 
protections against self-incrimination. Through a comparison of current legal doctrine 
with the Supreme Court’s pre-incorporation jurisprudence, this Article argues that courts 
should be more, not less, vigilant in their review of confessions obtained abroad, 
especially by regimes that are known to engage in torture. In practice, however, the 
opposite has occurred. Foreign interrogation practices are subject to far fewer constraints 
than domestic ones. That realization ought to give some pause to those who tout the 
supposed virtues of our criminal justice system. 
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B.A., University of Southern California, 2003; M.A., Northwestern University, 2007; J.D., Yale Law School, 
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Introduction 
That terrorism suspects captured abroad enjoy fewer constitutional 
rights than ordinary criminals is hardly a novel observation. Indeed, 
much of the debate over the last decade has centered on whether they 
should enjoy any constitutional rights at all.1 But it has become apparent 
that Article III trials for those accused of terrorism-related offenses are 
now the norm rather than the exception. The last prisoner transfer to 
Guantanamo Bay occurred more than eight years ago,2 and the Obama 
administration, like the Bush administration before it, has repeatedly 
used Article III courts to prosecute suspected terrorists.3 In 2013, 
President Obama reaffirmed his intention to close the Guantanamo 
detention facility and transfer the individuals housed there to the United 
 
 1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (confirming, in a 5–4 decision, that 
prisoners detained at Guantanamo Bay enjoy the right of habeas corpus); Gerald L. Neuman, 
Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2073, 2077 
(2005) (arguing that terrorists enjoy constitutional rights under a “mutuality of obligation” approach to 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected 
Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic? 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1975, 1975, 
2047 (2009) (describing the Court’s effort to define the legal boundaries of the war on terror as 
“quixotic,” and asserting that Boumediene “simply imposed the will of five Justices who disagreed 
personally and politically with the government’s detainee policies”). 
 2. Human Rights First, Guantanamo by the Numbers 2 (2016) (reporting last known arrival 
occurring on March 14, 2008).  
 3. N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Ctr. on Law & Sec., Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001–
September 11, 2011, 2 (2011) (documenting approximately 300 prosecutions of suspected terrorists 
between September 11, 2001–September 11, 2011). 
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States to stand trial.4 As such, the position that terrorism suspects are not 
entitled to any rights under our Constitution no longer seems tenable. 
While this development ought to be welcomed, it cannot be judged 
in isolation. Scholars ought to question what is to be gained from 
prosecuting terrorism suspects in Article III courts, particularly if those 
prosecutions threaten to erode traditional procedural protections for 
criminal defendants. The Bush administration pushed the boundaries of 
legality so far that extraordinary departures from ordinary criminal 
procedures now seem tame by comparison. 
Perhaps those who are eager to prove the worthiness of Article III 
courts believe it is possible to create a cabined “national security” 
exception for terrorism prosecutions.5 I am less sanguine. Treating 
terrorism suspects differently than ordinary criminals is itself an affront 
to core constitutional principles of due process and equal protection. But, 
the greater danger is that the law’s disparate treatment of terrorism 
suspects becomes the exception that swallows the rule. 
Rather than ask ourselves what might be gained from trying 
suspects in Article III courts, we would be better served to consider what 
is likely to be lost. To see why the danger of what some have termed 
“seepage” is not merely hypothetical,6 it is necessary to understand the 
nature of the criminal procedural rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
Those rights are “transsubstantive” in that they apply equally to all 
criminal suspects.7 For instance, the Fourth Amendment ordinarily 
requires probable cause for searches and seizures.8 As one scholar has 
noted, “that standard incorporates the entire criminal code without 
differentiation.”9 Likewise, the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-
incrimination applies to “any criminal case.”10 Consequently, when courts 
make law in terrorism cases, they are not just making law for terrorists. 
What they say is equally applicable to suspected drug dealers, pimps, 
 
 4. Charlie Savage, Amid Hunger Strike, Obama Renews Push to Close Cuba Prison, N.Y. Times (Apr. 
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/us/guantanamo-adds-medical-staff-amid-hunger-strike.html? 
pagewanted=all. 
 5. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Terrorism Prosecutions in U.S. Federal Court: Exceptions to 
Constitutional Evidence Rules and the Development of a Cabined Exception for Coerced Confessions, 
4 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 58 (2012). 
 6. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Terrorism Trials and the Article III Courts After Abu Ali, 
88 Tex. L. Rev. 1501, 1501 (2010). 
 7. William J. Stuntz, Essay, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137, 2140 (2002).  
 8. Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.1(a) (5th 
ed. 2013). 
 9. Stuntz, supra note 7, at 2140 n.7. 
 10. U.S. Const. amend V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, . . .”). 
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antitrust violators, fraudsters, child pornographers, and immigration 
offenders.11 
It is not easy, in other words, to divorce terrorism cases from our 
criminal procedure writ large. Both the amorphous nature of terrorism 
offensespredicated on ordinary criminal acts like murder or even 
noncriminal acts such as the provision of goods and servicesand the 
nature of our constitutional discourse, which presupposes that the scope 
of constitutional rights remains uniform and relatively fixed, would serve 
to defeat any such effort. When courts expound on the scope of Miranda 
protections overseas or the admissibility of evidence obtained without a 
search warrant, they are necessarily speaking not only of the rights of 
terrorists, but of the rights of all criminal suspects abroad. That latter 
category, as Justice Brennan presciently warned more than twenty-five 
years ago, is likely to grow ever larger as the United States seeks new 
ways to apply its laws overseas.12 
This Article tackles one threat that the current legal regime for 
Article III terrorism prosecutions poses to our core constitutional values: 
its lack of safeguards against coerced confessions. As courts have 
repeatedly recognized, the central purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Self-Incrimination Clause is to ensure that the accused is not compelled 
to be a witness against himself in a criminal proceeding.13 More 
controversially, Miranda warnings give expression to that right by 
requiring that any statements admitted into evidence be the product of a 
suspect’s knowing and voluntary choice.14 
Together, the Fifth Amendment and Miranda can be thought of as 
serving three basic values. First, they increase the probability that a 
confession offered into evidence is reliable.15 Second, they deter abusive 
police practices by preventing the use of illegally obtained confessions to 
prove guilt.16 And third, they protect the autonomy of the individual 
subjected to the psychological pressures of custodial interrogation by 
giving her a choice as to whether she shall speak or remain silent.17 
 
 11. Joshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Impair 
the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 81, 103–04 (2003) (“The historical 
record of the ‘drug exception’ and/or the ‘organized crime exception’ swallowing the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments is reason enough to beware the ‘leaching factor’ that may attend the changes 
terrorism cases have wrought.”).  
 12. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 280 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Foreign 
nationals must now take care not to violate our drug laws, our antitrust laws, our securities laws, and a 
host of other federal criminal statutes.”).  
 13. Id. at 264 (characterizing the right against self-incrimination as a “fundamental trial right of 
criminal defendants”). 
 14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 15. See generally Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936); Hopt v. Utah, 373 U.S. 503,  
508–11 (1884) (discussing situations where Miranda bolsters the probability that confessions are reliable). 
 16. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941).  
 17. See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 507 (1963). 
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These values should be no different whether the stationhouse is a 
foreign or domestic one. If anything, one might suspect that courts would 
be more skeptical of confessions obtained abroad, especially by regimes 
that are known to engage in torture. But precisely the opposite has 
occurred. Foreign interrogation practices are subject to far fewer 
constraints than domestic ones.18 Whereas scholars have previously 
assumed that statements obtained by torture cannot be admitted in U.S. 
courts, that assumption is now open to question as courts have, in recent 
years, admitted statements of terrorism suspects (or evidence derived 
therefrom) notwithstanding claims of torture.19 Moreover, executive 
agencies have concocted elaborate techniques for circumventing 
Miranda, some of which have been blessed by Article III courts. Such 
tactics include posing questions through foreign interrogators without the 
benefit of Miranda warnings,20 engaging in two-step interrogation 
techniques in which those warnings are purposefully omitted from initial 
“intelligence only” interrogations,21 and recasting the public safety 
exception to allow for broad questioning regarding any and all terrorist 
threats.22 Although this Article’s focus is on extraterritorial 
interrogations, it is worth noting that these tactics have begun to make 
inroads into the domestic sphere as well.23 
This Article is divided into three Parts. In Part I, I explain how the 
Supreme Court’s pre-incorporation jurisprudence has much to teach us 
 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmed, 94 F. Supp. 3d 394, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), reconsideration 
denied, No. 12-CR-661 (SLT)(S-2), 2015 WL 1636827 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2015) (declining to hold “taint” 
hearing despite defendants’ unchallenged assertion that they were tortured while in Djiboutian custody, 
and where the government agreed not to seek admission at trial of any statements obtained by U.S. or 
Djiboutian officials); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 234 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding district court’s 
decision to admit statements of terrorism suspect who claimed to have been tortured by Saudi officials); 
United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (admitting statements of Palestinian 
terrorism suspect notwithstanding claims of torture at hands of Israeli officials). But see United States v. 
Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (refusing to permit witness testimony where 
government’s knowledge of witness’s identity was a fruit of defendant’s torture).  
 20. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 225. 
 21. See infra Part III.B. 
 22. See Memorandum from the Acting Deputy Att’y Gen. on Custodial Interrogations and 
Intelligence-Gathering for Operational Terrorists Arrested Inside the United States (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/dag-memo-ciot.pdf. 
 23. Witness the prosecutions of Times Square would-be bomber Faisal Shazhad, the “underwear 
bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, and most recently, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Emily Bazelon has provided 
a succinct description of the current state of the law in a 2013 Slate article. See Emily Bazelon, Why Should I 
Care That No One’s Reading Dzhokhar Tsarnaev His Miranda Rights?, Slate (Apr. 19, 2013, 11:29 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/04/dzhokhar_tsarnaev_and_miranda_rig
hts_the_public_safety_exception_and_terrorism.html; see also United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-
20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *2–3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011) (admitting statements of terrorism 
suspect under the so-called “public-safety exception” notwithstanding that suspect “suffered third 
degree burns to his lower extremities, was transported to the hospital, was given 350 micrograms of 
fentanyl, and then interrogated for approximately 50 minutes by federal agents while he was in the 
burn care unit”). 
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about the current legal complexities regarding confessions obtained 
abroad. Specifically, I describe the voluntariness standard courts 
formerly applied to confessions obtained by state law enforcement 
agencies. I also examine the pre-incorporation “silver platter” doctrine 
that allowed federal courts to admit evidence seized by states in 
contravention of Fourth Amendment principles so long as federal 
officials neither directed nor participated in the search.24 Although these 
doctrines seem antiquated, they are actually highly relevant to assessing 
the admissibility of statements obtained abroad. 
Parts II and III focus on the particular dilemmas raised by overseas 
interrogations. Part II begins with a brief discussion of Miranda and its 
aftermath. My aim is to show that Miranda embodies a constitutional, 
rather than merely prophylactic, rule. That is to say, contrary to the 
decision’s critics, Miranda does not “sweep[] more broadly than the Fifth 
Amendment itself.”25 Instead, it is better understood as recognizing 
custodial interrogations for the inherently compulsive environments that 
they are.26 Accordingly, under Miranda’s logic, extracting statements in 
such settings without the benefit of warnings runs afoul of the Self-
Incrimination Clause. Only a valid waiver can make a custodial 
interrogation constitutional by ensuring that either a criminal suspect has 
voluntarily submitted to its compulsive forces, or that the coercive 
atmosphere has itself dissipated.27 
Courts typically approach statements obtained by foreign governments 
very differently. Such statements are not subject to Miranda’s protections at 
all, but are instead judged according to the older, pre-incorporation 
voluntariness standard.28 Overseas interrogations by U.S. law enforcement, 
by contrast, are subject to Miranda, albeit in modified form.29 As Part III 
explains, taken together, these doctrines create a perverse incentive that 
encourages U.S. officials to use foreign governments in order to circumvent 
Miranda’s requirements. But even where U.S. officials choose to conduct an 
interrogation themselves, we should be skeptical that Miranda provides any 
meaningful restraint on their actions. That is because an increasingly 
common technique of “two-step” interrogations has evolved, whereby an 
initial “dirty” un-Mirandized interrogation, supposedly conducted for 
intelligence purposes only, is followed by a Mirandized interrogation 
intended to “cleanse” the statements of their earlier taint so they can be 
 
 24. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1949).  
 25. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 702 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)).  
 26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966) (“Unless adequate protective devices are 
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the 
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” (emphasis added)). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. Id. 
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admitted at trial.30 Moreover, the government’s broadened view of the 
“public safety” exception purports to allow it to use even those 
statements that are unwarned.31 
All of these practices have become commonplace in the last decade. 
As a consequence, Fifth Amendment protections for terrorism suspects 
have been severely diminished. For those inclined to think in cost-benefit 
terms, courts’ willingness to countenance false positives in terrorism 
investigations might be welcomed as a logical reflection of terrorism’s 
severity. But even if one accepts this sliding-scale approach to 
constitutional rights, the lack of a limiting principle should be troubling. 
And while the tactics used in terrorism cases have yet to be deployed 
regularly in ordinary criminal investigations, the likelihood of that 
happening increases substantially with each passing judicial opinion 
sanctifying their use. The pressure for courts to approve such techniques 
will only intensify as the Obama administration seeks to try more 
suspects in domestic courts. This realization ought to give proponents of 
Article III courts some pause before touting the supposed virtues of our 
criminal justice system. 
 
I.  The Law of Coerced Confessions Before MIRANDA 
A. The Pre-Incorporation Voluntariness Standard 
Those who supported the Self-Incrimination Clause’s inclusion in 
the Bill of Rights saw it as embodying a long-standing Anglo-American 
tradition prohibiting the admission of statements procured through 
torture.32 At first glance, then, it is puzzling that the Supreme Court for 
much of its history analyzed the admissibility of confessions under the 
Due Process Clause.33 The solution only begins to reveal itself when one 
realizes that the Self-Incrimination Clause was not incorporated against 
 
 30. See Defendant Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed’s Post-Hearing Memorandum in Support of His Motion 
to Suppress Post-Arrest Statements at 44–65, United States v. Ahmed, No. 10-cr-131, 2012 WL 1805050 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012) (discussing that the two-step interrogation technique apparently evolved in the late 
1990s to deal specifically with terrorism investigations); see Roberto Suro, FBI’s ‘Clean’ Teams Follow ‘Dirty’ 
Spy Work, Wash. Post (Aug. 16, 1993), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/daily/aug99/ 
dirty16.htm; Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, The New 
Yorker, Feb. 15, 2010, at 52 (discussing how a “clean team” was used with the aim of allowing the U.S. 
government to use Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s statements against him in federal court, though the Obama 
administration’s efforts to do so were eventually frustrated by congressional republicans). 
 31. Memorandum from the Acting Deputy Att’y Gen. on Custodial Interrogations, supra note 22. 
 32. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 857, 865 n.20 (1995). 
 33. See, e.g., Aschcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154–55 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 
278, 285–87 (1936). 
Keenan-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016  4:29 PM 
1702 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1695 
the states until 1964 and was generally thought to apply to in-court 
proceedings only.34 
Although the drafting history of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause is surprisingly “sparse and ambiguous,”35 two 
related but distinct rationales seem to have provided the impetus behind 
its ratification. One was a common law rule that excluded coerced 
confessions on the basis of their apparent unreliability.36 The other was a 
rule that acknowledged individual autonomy by prohibiting courts from 
compelling witnesses to testify under oath by threatening them with 
contempt.37 In an 1897 decision, Bram v. United States, the Supreme 
Court found both values embodied in the Self-Incrimination Clause.38 
The question before the Court in Bram was whether a law enforcement 
officer’s implicit threat to imprison a suspect until he submitted to 
interrogation constituted compulsion under the Fifth Amendment.39 The 
Court found that it did, and therefore, the officers could not use Bram’s 
statements against him because they “must necessarily have been the 
result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on the mind.”40 Bram, 
however, had virtually no effect on the law of coerced confessions prior 
to Miranda.41 For the next sixty plus years, the Supreme Court opted to 
review both state and federal confessions through a due process 
framework instead.42 This approach reflected the Court’s belief, contrary 
to Bram, that the Self-Incrimination Clause only prohibited compelled 
in-court testimony and, therefore, did not apply to statements made 
during custodial interrogations.43 
 
 34. See generally Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that “the Fifth Amendment’s exception 
from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from abridgment by the 
states”). 
 35. Ronald J. Allen, Essay, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 71, 73 (2006). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 73–74. 
 38. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543–49 (1897). 
 39. Id. at 562 (“It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in which the accused was when 
the statement was made to him that the other suspected person had charged him with crime, the result 
was to produce upon his mind the fear that, if he remained silent, it would be considered an admission 
of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty person; and it cannot 
be conceived that the converse impression would not also have naturally arisen that, by denying, there 
was hope of removing the suspicion from himself.”). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Allen, supra note 35, at 74.  
 42. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 210 (1960); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561 
(1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957); Aschcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154–55 (1944); 
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228–29 (1940); White v. 
Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 530–31 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–87 (1936).  
 43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 510 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Historically, the privilege 
against self-incrimination did not bear at all on the use of extra-legal confessions, for which distinct 
standards evolved; indeed, ‘the history of the two principles is wide apart, differing by one hundred years 
in origin, and derived through separate lines of precedents.’” (citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2266, at 
401 (McNaughton rev. 1961))). 
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When it came to reviewing the actions of state officials prior to the 
incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, the Supreme Court 
could rely on neither the Self-Incrimination Clause nor its inherent 
supervisory powers over lower federal courts to invalidate confessions. 
The Court, however, frequently found itself confronted with instances of 
abhorrent state behavior. Nowhere was the conduct more egregious than 
in the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi.44 The appellants in Brown were 
black tenant farmers who confessed to murder only after police officers, 
with the assistance of a white mob, hanged and whipped one of the 
defendants until he confessed.45 The State argued that the trial court’s 
decision to admit the confession was immune from attack because the 
sole protection against coerced confessions was the Self-Incrimination 
Clause, which only constrained federal officials and only applied to in-
court witness testimony.46 The Court’s Justices, understandably appalled 
by the facts before them, unanimously rejected Mississippi’s argument. 
In so doing, they distinguished “[c]ompulsion by torture to extort a 
confession” from the sort of nonphysical, in-court compulsion thought at 
the time to be the object of the Self-Incrimination Clause.47 Although the 
state was free to regulate its court process however it saw fit, it could not 
dispense with “due process of law.”48 Even if the State was within its 
rights to radically depart from traditional procedure by, say, abolishing 
the jury, it could not “substitute trial by ordeal” in its place or rely on the 
“rack and torture chamber” in place of the witness stand.49 Brown 
marked the beginning of an era in which the Court began reviewing state 
confessions by invoking a “voluntariness” standard embedded in 
fundamental notions of due process.50 
 
 44. See Brown, 297 U.S. 278, 279–80. 
 45. Jenny-Brooke Condon, Extraterritorial Interrogation: The Porous Border Between Torture 
and U.S. Criminal Trials, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 647, 660 (2008). 
 46. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 285–86. 
 50. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (“While Bram was decided before Brown 
and its progeny, for the middle third of the 20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced 
confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process. We applied the due process voluntariness 
test in ‘some 30 different cases decided during the era that intervened between Brown and Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 [(1964)].’” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
218, 223 (1973)).  
Keenan-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016  4:29 PM 
1704 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1695 
Voluntariness, however, proved to be a concept more easily defined 
in theory than in practice. The Court in Culombe v. Connecticut provided 
a succinct, if not particularly helpful, “test” for voluntariness:  
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used 
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends 
due process.51  
But as the more than thirty Supreme Court opinions issued between 
Brown and Miranda attest, the Court had great difficulty reaching a 
consensus on what kinds of practices were sufficient to render a confession 
involuntary.52 Justice Frankfurter, for his part, felt compelled to 
acknowledge that “[t]he notion of ‘voluntariness’ is itself an amphibian.”53 
The Court elaborated in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: 
Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks 
capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statementseven those 
made under brutal treatmentare “voluntary” in the sense of 
representing a choice of alternatives. On the other hand, if “voluntariness” 
incorporates notions of “butfor” [sic] cause, the question should be 
whether the statement would have been made even absent inquiry or 
other official action. Under such a test, virtually no statement would be 
voluntary because very few people give incriminating statements in the 
absence of official action of some kind.54 
Faced with these two extremes, the Court opted for a middle ground 
approach in which it balanced the autonomy interests of individuals and 
general notions of fairness against law enforcement’s need for 
information. The laundry list of relevant factors the Court used to gauge 
voluntarinessthe length of the detention; whether the suspect had been 
advised of any of his constitutional rights; the accused’s age, intelligence, 
and education level; the circumstances of the questioning, including 
threats of physical punishment; deprivation of food or sleep; etc.rarely 
produced agreement between the Court’s liberal and conservative 
members.55 Perhaps that lack of consensus is why the Court never 
 
 51. Culombe v. Connecticute, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). 
 52. Id. at 601 (“In light of our past opinions and in light of the wide divergence of views which 
men may reasonably maintain concerning the propriety of various police investigative procedures not 
involving the employment of obvious brutality, this much seems certain: It is impossible for this Court, 
in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt precisely to delimit, or to surround with specific, 
all-inclusive restrictions, the power of interrogation allowed to state law enforcement officers in 
obtaining confessions.”). 
 53. Id. at 605.  
 54. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 224 (quoting Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, 
Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 Colum. 
L. Rev. 62, 72–73 (1966)). 
 55. M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 
12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 319, 337 (2003) (noting that while the “Brown decision was unanimous,” 
the Court’s later opinions evidenced “a deeply fractured Court”). 
Keenan-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016  4:29 PM 
August 2016]      COERCED CONFESSIONS ABROAD 1705 
developed a clear formula for assessing the relative weight of the test’s 
various inputs. 
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, for instance, the Court held by a 6–3 vote 
that a confession was the result of a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause when it was procured primarily 
through psychological, rather than physical, compulsion.56 The suspect in 
Ashcraft had been held “incommunicado, without sleep or rest” for 
thirty-six hours following his arrest, at the end of which “relays of 
officers, experienced investigators, and highly trained lawyers questioned 
him without respite.”57 Such a process, according to the Court, appeared 
“so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the 
possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect against whom its full 
coercive force is brought to bear.”58 But to the dissenters, on whose 
behalf Justice Jackson wrote, the majority’s approach amounted to 
deeming a confession unconstitutional merely because the process by 
which it was obtained consisted of “conduct which we may personally 
disapprove.”59 To avoid such value-driven judgments, Justice Jackson 
would have drawn a bright line between physical abuse and the kind of 
mental coercion he viewed to be an inherent (and acceptable) aspect of 
police interrogation. Moreover, Justice Jackson warned that “the 
principles by which we may adjudge when [police questioning] passes 
constitutional limits are quite different from those that condemn police 
brutality, and are far more difficult to apply.”60 
Notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s reservations, the Court took a 
further step towards invalidating psychological pressure tactics in Spano 
v. New York.61 There, it found a due process violation when the police 
ignored a suspect’s persistent refusal to submit to interrogation as well as 
his repeated requests to speak with counsel over an eight-hour 
interrogation session.62 The suspect only confessed after his childhood 
friend, then a cadet at the police academy, falsely told the suspect that he 
had gotten the friend “in a lot of trouble.”63 Writing for the majority, 
Chief Justice Warren explained that the Court’s decision was not merely 
a reflection of the “inherent untrustworthiness”64 of such confessions, but 
also the “deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while 
enforcing the law.”65 While acknowledging that the Court had not been 
 
 56. Aschcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 154. 
 59. Id. at 158 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 160. 
 61. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
 62. Id. at 323–24. 
 63. Id. at 322–23. 
 64. Id. at 320.  
 65. Id. 
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presented with interrogations involving physical brutality since Brown, 
Chief Justice Warren noted that the more “sophisticated” methods used 
to obtain confessions made the Court’s “duty to enforce federal 
constitutional protections” more difficult and invited “more delicate 
judgments to be made.”66 In placing the emphasis on the suspect’s 
overborne will,67 the Court showed more concern for the individual’s 
right to choose whether to confess than it did for the reliability of the 
confession itself.68 
The logical next step was for the Court to conclude, as it did in 
Miranda, that custodial interrogations are constitutionally problematic 
because their inherent coerciveness compels suspects to speak against 
their will.69 Accordingly, the proper rubric for analyzing coerced 
confessions became the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause 
rather than the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments.70 Incorporation, of course, made such a move practically 
feasible. As is argued further in Part II, Miranda is best understood as 
recognizing a constitutional rule, not inventing a prophylactic one, as its 
detractors often claim. That is because Miranda interpreted the Self-
Incrimination Clause as affording criminal suspects the right to be free 
from custodial interrogation. Like most other constitutional rights, this 
“right to remain silent” is waivable by the individual.71 Hence, law 
enforcement is not prohibited from conducting interrogations full stop, 
but they must simply obtain an individual’s consent before proceeding to 
do so. Statistical studies indicate that roughly eighty percent of criminal 
suspects submit to interrogation voluntarily.72 
Although the Miranda warning/waiver framework has replaced the 
voluntariness test for domestic criminal interrogations, the latter is not 
entirely obsolete. In addition to overseas interrogations by foreign 
governments, the voluntariness inquiry continues to guide courts’ 
analysis in two important areas. First, Miranda waivers themselves have 
predictably given rise to allegations of coercion. Accordingly, courts 
continue to employ the voluntariness test in determining whether 
waivers were validly executed.73 Second, in the Fourth Amendment 
context, questions often arise as to whether a search of a suspect’s person 
 
 66. Id. at 321. 
 67. Id. at 323. 
 68. Id. at 320. 
 69. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966). 
 70. Id. at 459. 
 71. See generally Alfred Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1050, 1055 (1978) (discussing the forfeitures that arise from procedural defaults in the 
assertion of constitutional rights in criminal cases). 
 72. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of 
the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839, 868 (1996). 
 73. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
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or property was consensual. In 1973, the Burger Court rejected the 
invitation to extend Miranda’s rationale to such searches.74 Consequently, 
officers need not issue any warnings prior to asking for consent to search 
one’s person or property. Instead, courts look to the traditional 
voluntariness test to judge whether such consent was obtained free of 
undue coercion. 
The voluntariness test is obviously weaker than the bright-line rule 
laid down in Miranda. Indeed, one suspects this is why the Burger Court 
favored its adoption in the search context over the objections of the 
Court’s more liberal members.75 Because it invites courts to engage in a 
balancing of variables, the inclusion and relative weight of which are 
both easily manipulated, determinations of admissibility are likely to 
reflect judges’ preexisting policy preferences. 
As Part II explains, this is problematic in the coerced confessions 
context because judges are likely to favor wide latitude for government 
actors seeking to prevent future terrorist attacks. Indeed, there are 
already voices in the academy complaining that the voluntariness 
standard is too stringent and will handicap legitimate law enforcement 
efforts. UCLA Professor Norman Abrams, for instance, has remarked 
that the Court’s voluntariness doctrine “appears to bar the police from 
using a number of techniques and practices in ordinary crime cases that 
do not approach an ‘extremely cruel’ standard, or even a cruel method.”76 
He goes on to argue that “[t]he use of such non-extreme techniques to 
ferret out information, while violating standards of how we want the 
police to behave in ordinary criminal cases, should not be prohibited 
when there is exigency and the interrogation is directed to obtaining 
intelligence to prevent terrorism actions.”77 
Abrams’ argument, that terrorism suspects can, or ought to be, 
treated differently, finds little support in the Constitution. But, there is 
undeniable merit to his observation that, in the absence of a cabined 
exception for terrorism cases, ad hoc judicial lawmaking under a 
voluntariness standard will lead courts to stretch preexisting doctrine.78 
Indeed, as this Article argues in Parts II and III, several courts have 
already done just that. 
 
 74. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). 
 75. Accord Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and 
Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 241 (1983) (“At the doctrinal level, Burger 
Court decisions that have relaxed the ‘waiver’ standard for fourth and fifth amendment rights reflect 
this crime control theme. The Court has slighted concerns about whether the individual intelligently 
relinquished these rights by refusing to give them any dispositive weight.”). 
 76. Abrams, supra note 5, at 92–93. 
 77. Id. at 93. 
 78. Id. at 112–13. 
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B. Information-Sharing Between Sovereigns: The Origins of 
the “Joint Venture” Doctrine 
The joint venture doctrine is another remnant of pre-incorporation 
law whose relevance has been resuscitated by the legal complexities 
arising from the war on terrorism. Although originally invented to deal 
with problems arising out of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on 
unreasonable searches, its rationale is equally applicable to the modern 
Fifth Amendment law of overseas confessions. Regrettably, courts have 
yet to apply the lessons of this pre-incorporation doctrine to 
contemporary joint investigations between the United States and foreign 
nations. As Part III suggests, that failure is likely a reflection of judicial 
policy preferences. The joint venture doctrine as it existed during the 
Prohibition was designed to elicit adherence to the Constitution. In 
contrast, courts in terrorism prosecutions have expressed a preference 
for encouraging cooperation between the United States and foreign 
governments by freeing law enforcement from constitutional restraints.79 
As was true of confessions law, prior to incorporation, state officials 
were not subject to the constitutional limitations of the Fourth 
Amendment. In fact, the Court had explicitly rejected efforts to 
incorporate the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule against the 
states80 until it reversed course in 1961 when it decided Mapp v. Ohio.81 
But, unlike pre-incorporation confessions law, in which the same due 
process standard governed both federal and state interrogations, 
searches and seizures by federal and state authorities were judged by 
different measures. This created a host of problems for courts tasked 
with interpreting the legality of joint state-federal operations. The 
obvious concern was that federal law enforcement would have state 
officials do their bidding for them in order to circumvent constitutional 
safeguards.82 
The problem became most pronounced during Prohibition. State 
and federal officials would often work together investigating organized 
criminal enterprises involved in alcohol smuggling and a host of other 
criminal activity that was primarily local in character. Consequently, 
issues frequently arose over whether to admit evidence obtained by state 
officers where the methods those officers employed, while perhaps legal 
 
 79. See infra Part II.A. 
 80. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
 81. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Falloco, 277 F. 75, 81–82 (W.D. Mo. 1922) (noting that “the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is not directed to individual conduct of state 
officials,” but suppressing evidence where “there were conferences between state and federal authorities” 
that “were held with a view to a closer co-operation between the two jurisdictions in the enforcement of 
the prohibitory law” and where the state-federal cooperation was “systematic and frictionless”). 
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under state law, offended Fourth Amendment notions of reasonableness.83 
In making those determinations, the Court had to decide whether the 
level of federal involvement was enough to convert the operation into a 
joint venture subject to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and 
particularity requirements. Put differently, did any federal participation 
render the Fourth Amendment applicable, or did state actors have to act 
as the federal government’s agents? 
The Court first excluded evidence obtained as the result of a joint 
venture in 1927. Byars v. United States was a case in which local officials 
obtained a valid state law search warrant, but one that would have run 
afoul of the Fourth Amendment, both because it failed to establish 
probable cause, and because it lacked a particularized description of the 
items to be seized.84 The joint venture problem arose when local officials, 
after first obtaining the warrant from a municipal judge, invited a federal 
agent to participate in the search.85 As was true of many joint venture 
cases from the period, Byars involved an investigation into alcohol 
offenses. The federal Prohibition agent who accompanied the local 
officials on the search acknowledged that he “had no authority for going 
into the house other than the search warrant that the officers had secured 
from the state authorities.”86 The search resulted in the discovery of 
counterfeit strip stamps used on bottled-in-bond whiskey, evidence 
federal prosecutors subsequently used to convict Byars.87 
Writing on behalf of a unanimous Court, Justice Sutherland deemed 
the search illegal and reversed Byars’ conviction. He explained that while 
“mere participation” by a federal officer in a state search “does not 
render it a federal undertaking,” such participation does require the 
Court to “scrutinize the attendant facts with an eye to detect and a hand 
to prevent violations of the Constitution by circuitous and indirect 
methods.”88 In the instant case, the Court found that the federal agent 
had participated “upon the chance, which was subsequently realized, that 
something would be disclosed of official interest to him as such agent.”89 
Moreover, the state official had invited the federal official to join him, as 
opposed to a fellow local officer, precisely because he suspected they 
would uncover evidence of federal criminal wrongdoing.90 Indeed, the 
 
 83. Irvin B. Nathan & Christopher D. Man, Coordinated Criminal Investigations Between the United 
States and Foreign Governments and Their Implications for American Constitutional Rights, 42 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 821, 823 (2002). 
 84. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927) (“The warrant clearly is bad if tested by the 
Fourth Amendment and the laws of the United States.”). 
 85. Id. at 29, 30–31. 
 86. Id. at 31. 
 87. Id. at 29. 
 88. Id. at 32. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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federal officer took possession of all evidence seized and held it in his 
exclusive possession.91 Given these facts, the Court concluded that the 
federal official participated “under color of his federal office,” thereby 
rendering the search “in substance and effect . . . a joint operation of the 
local and federal officers.”92 
The Court decided another joint venture case involving alcohol 
offenses that same year, in Gambino v. United States.93 In Gambino, New 
York state troopers stopped the defendants’ car at the Canadian border 
without a search warrant and seized liquor, which they subsequently 
turned over to federal officials.94 The Gambino Court framed the 
question as “whether, although the state troopers were not agents of the 
United States, their relation to the federal prosecution was such as to 
require the exclusion of the evidence wrongfully obtained.”95 
Recognizing that no federal officials participated directly in the search 
itself, the Court nonetheless deemed the evidence inadmissible. In doing 
so, it emphasized that the “sole” purpose of the stop was to aid federal 
officials in the enforcement of the National Prohibition Act.96 The state 
troopers had no valid basis for the seizure or subsequent search under 
state law, but rather, felt bound to aid in the enforcement of the 
Prohibition Act.97 While acknowledging that the troopers did not “act[] 
under the directions of the federal officials in making the arrest and 
seizure,” the Court held that “the rights guaranteed by the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments may be invaded as effectively by such co-operation as 
by the state officers acting under direction of federal officials.”98 
Consequently, the evidence seized should not have been admitted in the 
defendants’ federal trial because the state officers had lacked probable 
cause as required by the Fourth Amendment. 
Byars and Gambino combined to form a robust barrier to the 
admission in federal trials of evidence seized in contravention of the 
Fourth Amendment. Read together, the cases mandated exclusion 
whenever either a federal official had participated in the search or state 
officials had conducted the search with the sole purpose of aiding the 
enforcement of federal law.99 
The Court went a step further in Lustig v. United States by creating a 
bright-line rule against admission whenever a federal official “had a hand 
 
 91. Id. at 32–33. 
 92. Id. at 33. 
 93. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). 
 94. Id. at 312–13. 
 95. Id. at 314. 
 96. Id. at 315. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 316. 
 99. Nathan & Man, supra note 83, at 828. 
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in” the search.100 Justice Frankfurter’s plurality opinion explained what 
came to be known as the “silver platter doctrine”: 
The crux of that doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official if 
he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence 
secured by state authorities is turned over to federal authorities on a silver 
platter. The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the Byars 
case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enterprise of 
securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means.101 
In Lustig, the Court concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation 
had occurred where a Secret Service agent had observed suspicious activity 
through the keyhole of a suspect’s hotel room and tipped off state 
officials.102 After obtaining a local search warrant, those officials invited the 
agent to help inventory the contents of the room, which included evidence 
later used to convict the suspect of federal counterfeiting violations.103 
Later, in Elkins v. United States, decided in 1960, explicitly overruled 
the silver platter doctrine of Lustig, but left intact the jurisprudence that 
had preceded it.104 While those earlier cases may have produced a rule that 
was “difficult and unpredictable,”105 the silver platter doctrine went too far 
in encouraging federal officials to turn a blind eye to behavior that was 
offensive to constitutional principles. The Court explained: 
Free and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement 
officers is to be commended and encouraged. Yet that kind of cooperation 
is hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal officers to 
withdraw from such association and at least tacitly to encourage state 
officers in the disregard of constitutionally protected freedom. If, on the 
other hand, it is understood that the fruit of an unlawful search by state 
agents will be inadmissible in a federal trial, there can be no inducement to 
subterfuge and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in 
criminal investigation. Instead, forthright cooperation under constitutional 
standards will be promoted and fostered.106 
Between Lustig and Elkins, the Court had determined that the 
Fourth Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but declined to adopt the exclusionary rule as a 
constitutionally mandated remedy.107 The Elkins Court, therefore, relied 
on its supervisory power over lower federal courts to repudiate the silver 
platter doctrine.108 
 
 100. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949). 
 101. Id. at 78–79. 
 102. Id. at 76, 79–80. 
 103. Id. at 76–77. 
 104. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223–24 (1960). 
 105. Id. at 212. 
 106. Id. at 221–22. 
 107. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
 108. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 216 (“What is here invoked is the Court’s supervisory power over the 
administration of criminal justice in the federal courts, under which the Court has ‘from the very 
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Elkins’ relevance to domestic investigations turned out to be short-
lived. Scarcely a year after the opinion was issued, the Court decided in 
Mapp v. Ohio that the exclusionary rule was constitutionally mandated 
in both state and federal proceedings.109 
The joint venture doctrine’s usefulness lives on, however, in the 
context of foreign interrogations. Although the Supreme Court has never 
directly addressed the issue, several lower courts have described 
international investigations between the United States and foreign 
governments as joint ventures that may, under certain conditions, 
implicate constitutional protections.110 With respect to the Fourth 
Amendment, the international joint venture doctrine has lost much of its 
importance given the Court’s holding in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez: That foreign nationals do not enjoy Fourth Amendment 
protections in their persons or possessions outside the United States, 
even when the United States is the relevant government actor directing 
the investigation.111 The Fifth Amendment, however, is a different matter 
altogether. Significantly, it applies to all “persons” as opposed to “the 
people.”112 Perhaps more importantly, as the Verdugo-Urquidez majority 
recognized, the Self-Incrimination Clause has been interpreted as 
primarily a trial right,113 meaning violations of the clause occur at the 
time the government seeks to introduce the statements into evidence.114 
Consequently, a statement may be deemed compelled regardless of 
where its words are spoken. 
But, because statements obtained by foreign governments are not 
subject to Miranda and are instead adjudged according to the lower 
voluntariness standard described above, the locus of a statement’s 
recording actually matters a great deal in practice. In the absence of a 
robust international joint venture doctrine, U.S. officials are incentivized 
 
beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions.’” 
(citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943))). 
 109. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Vilar, 
No. S305-cr-621 KMK, 2007 WL 1075041 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007); United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 
57, 61 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Heller, 
625 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978); Cranford v. 
Rodriguez, 512 F.2d 860, 863–64 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 
1972); United States v. Dopf, 434 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 111. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990). 
 112. Compare U.S. Const. amend. V, with U.S. Const. amend. IV (distinguishing between 
“persons” in the Fifth Amendment and “people” in the Fourth Amendment). 
 113. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (“The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by 
the Fifth Amendment is a fundamental trial right of criminal defendants.”). 
 114. Id. (“Although conduct by law enforcement officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that 
right, a constitutional violation occurs only at trial.” (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 
(1972))). 
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to “outsource” interrogations to foreign governments. As Part III argues, 
this is precisely what has occurred. 
II.  Interrogations Abroad 
Interrogations abroad take three basic forms. First, there are 
matters that are exclusively investigated by foreign governments with an 
eye towards prosecuting violations of those governments’ domestic laws. 
Occasionally, such investigations will uncover evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing that violates U.S. law, and the foreign government, if it is so 
inclined, will alert U.S. authorities and share incriminatory statements 
provided by the accused.115 Second, there are interrogations conducted 
exclusively by U.S. authorities as part of a U.S. criminal investigation, or 
intelligence gathering effort.116 Depending on the circumstances, foreign 
governments may or may not be involved in providing U.S. officials with 
logistical support. Between these two extremes lies a more common third 
scenario: joint investigations that entail cooperation between the United 
States and foreign governments.117 In theory, at least, joint investigations 
ought to pose the greatest difficulties for courts. those difficulties are 
addressed extensively in Part III. For the time being, however, I focus my 
attention on the two extremes, for that is where courts have thus far had 
the most to say. 
This Part is comprised of two Subparts. Subpart A explains the law 
of coerced confessions as it applies to statements elicited by foreign 
governments. Subpart B, in turn, considers what rules apply when U.S. 
officials conduct overseas interrogations, at least insofar as they seek to 
admit statements procured during those interrogations at subsequent 
criminal trials. 
A preliminary word must be said about the nature of the Miranda 
decision. For much of the last fifty years, scholars and jurists have 
fiercely debated whether Miranda embodies a constitutional rule 
coextensive with the Fifth Amendment or a judge made prophylactic rule 
that overprotects constitutional rights in order to achieve effective 
deterrence of unlawful police behavior.118 Which side one takes in this 
 
 115. See, e.g., United States v. Bary, 978 F. Supp. 2d 356, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Instead, the U.K. 
police conducted a ‘completely British operation’ in which Abdel Bary was arrested and interviewed. As 
this operation was not a joint venture with the U.S. government, no Miranda warnings were required.”). 
 116. Fred Medick, Exporting Miranda: Protecting the Right Against Self-Incrimination When U.S. 
Officers Perform Custodial Interrogations Abroad, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 173 (2009) (explaining 
the Mirandized U.S. interrogation of Zeinab Taleb-Jedi, an American citizen accused of materially 
supporting MeK). 
 117. For example, see United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 118. Compare Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 299 (1980) (refusing to interpret Miranda “narrowly” 
and noting that “[t]he concern of the Court in Miranda was that the ‘interrogation environment’ created by 
the interplay of interrogation and custody would ‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and 
thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination”), with New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 
649, 654 (1984) (“The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are ‘not themselves rights protected by the 
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debate is likely to determine how one views the constitutionality of the 
coerced confessions doctrine as it has been applied abroad. 
The Supreme Court, for its part, has taken great pains to confuse 
the matter. With ample reason, scholars have described the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area as “internally inconsistent” and “incoherent.”119 
In the three decades after Miranda was decided, the Court expended 
much effort debating the nature of its commands. In 1984, the Court’s 
conservative wing scored a victory when, in a 5–4 decision, it described 
Miranda as a prophylactic rule that could be dispensed with whenever 
“overriding considerations of public safety” justified doing so.120 This led 
many commentators to suspect Miranda was nearing its death. But then 
in 2000, the Court’s liberal and conservative wings reached a sort of 
pragmatic détente. By holding that Miranda was a “constitutional 
decision,” the Court refuted Congress’s attempt to statutorily will it out 
of being.121 At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed the 
continuing vitality of Miranda exceptions like Quarles, essentially 
freezing the doctrine in place.122 
In what follows, this Article unapologetically adopts the view that 
Miranda was not merely a “constitutional decision”whatever that 
meansbut the recognition of a constitutional rule that custodial 
interrogations are per se unconstitutional absent Miranda warnings. Under 
any fair reading, Miranda cannot be characterized as merely prophylactic. 
Indeed, as Justice O’Connor, ordinarily no friend of Miranda, felt 
obligated to recognize in her Quarles concurrence, Miranda “held 
unconstitutional, because inherently compelled, the admission of 
statements derived from in-custody questioning not preceded by an 
explanation of the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
consequences of forgoing it.”123 Although she disagreed with that holding, 
O’Connor at least recognized it for what it was. The same cannot be said 
for the Court’s more conservative members, who instead launched a 
sideways assault on Miranda by purposefully distorting its meaning. 
 
Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] 
protected.’” (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))) (illustrating the Court’s inconsistent 
interpretations of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence as either being rooted in the Constitution or constructed 
by judges). 
 119. Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final FrontierThe International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United 
States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 Duke L.J. 1703, 1750 (2002); 
M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 Brook. L. Rev. 
241, 245 n.27 (2002). 
 120. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651. 
 121. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). 
 122. Id. at 441 (“These decisions illustrate the principlenot that Miranda is not a constitutional 
rulebut that no constitutional rule is immutable. No court laying down a general rule can possibly 
foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications 
represented by these cases are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.”). 
 123. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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One must nevertheless concede the success of that assault. Today, 
the Supreme Court routinely labels Miranda a prophylactic rule.124 The 
implicit assumption is that its requirements ought to be subject to a 
general balancing test that weighs society’s need for information against 
the individual’s right to be free from compulsion.125 And yet, in contrast 
to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, there is 
nothing in the text of the Self-Incrimination Clause that would permit 
courts to engage in such a balancing test. As I argue here, the confusion 
around Miranda’s nature has produced a perverse outcome. Judges 
appear to be in fact applying a balancing test, though they avoid naming 
it as such. Terrorism suspects, of course, are almost always destined to 
come out on the losing end of such tests. The result is law that speaks 
more generally about what law enforcement is permitted to do in the 
context of international investigations, but which nearly always favors 
expansive interpretations of government power. 
A. Interrogations by Foreign Governments 
If one accepts the premise that Miranda deems custodial 
interrogations inherently coercive, then U.S. courts should not admit 
incriminating statements absent some indication that the suspect has 
affirmatively made a knowledgeable and voluntary waiver of his or her 
right not to speak. Of course, that is not to say confessions may only be 
admitted if foreign governments adhere to a specific articulation of 
Miranda warnings. The Miranda Court itself stipulated that its decision 
was not intended to create a “constitutional straitjacket” and that “other 
procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of 
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise 
it” would be constitutionally permissible.126 
At a minimum, it would seem that if one takes seriously the idea 
that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive, then to be admissible, 
statements made to foreign governments would have to at least be 
preceded by a warning that the suspect need not speak. The question of 
whether counsel must be provided upon request is a more difficult one. 
Both the Miranda and Edwards courts laid great stress on a suspect’s 
 
 124. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269 (2011) (“[T]his Court in Miranda 
adopted a set of prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination.”); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (“We have likewise established the 
Miranda exclusionary rule as a prophylactic measure to prevent violations of the right protected by the 
text of the Self-Incrimination Clausethe admission into evidence in a criminal case of confessions 
obtained through coercive custodial questioning.”); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437 (noting that the Court 
has repeatedly referred to the Miranda warnings as “prophylactic”).  
 125. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and 
Understandings, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 781, 790 (2006) (“Today, the Miranda warnings are most accurately 
considered a judge-made, prophylactic rule, the application of which can be subjected to a balancing test.”). 
 126. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
Keenan-67.6.doc (Do Not Delete) 9/8/2016  4:29 PM 
1716 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:1695 
ability to confer with counsel,127 so it would be reasonable to conclude 
that the availability of counsel is a necessary precursor to any valid 
waiver of one’s right against self-incrimination. But different cultures 
have different legal traditions, and it may be a step too far to assume that 
custodial interrogations abroad are always compulsory in the absence of 
counsel. 
In any event, the foregoing is largely a matter of academic curiosity 
because U.S. courts have uniformly declined to apply the Miranda 
warning/waiver framework to statements made to foreign officials.128 The 
logic of these decisions rests on two erroneous assumptions. First, courts 
that view Miranda as representing a prophylactic rule against unlawful 
police behavior reason that the exclusion in an American trial of 
statements obtained abroad will have no deterrent effect on foreign 
officials.129 While that is probably overstating the matter slightly, the 
general sentiment is logical. However, as previously explained, such 
reasoning misunderstands the nature of Miranda. If waivers are required 
because custodial interrogations are inherently coercive, then deterrence 
is largely beside the point. Second, courts have sometimes said that the 
United States “cannot dictate the protections provided to criminal 
suspects by foreign nations.”130 True enough, but the relevancy of this 
observation to the issue of a confession’s admissibility is unclear. If 
meant to suggest law enforcement officials must either use the unwarned 
statements or forego introducing a confession altogether, it represents a 
false choice. Under ordinary circumstances, U.S. law enforcement 
personnel remain free to question a suspect themselves. The Supreme 
Court has never held, and no commentator as far as I know has ever 
suggested, that the taint of an earlier unwarned interrogation is 
incurable, particularly if that taint was caused by an entirely different law 
enforcement agency. 
 
 127. Id. at 469 (“[T]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the 
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.”); Arizona v. 
Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981) (“The Fifth Amendment right identified in Miranda is the right 
to have counsel present at any custodial interrogation.”). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 227 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[V]oluntary statements 
obtained from a defendant by foreign law enforcement officers, even without Miranda warnings, 
generally are admissible.”); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he law is 
settled that statements taken by foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings are admissible if 
voluntary.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227 (noting “deterrence of unlawful police activityis absent 
when foreign agents direct an interrogation”); United States v. Martindale, 790 F.2d 1129, 1132 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he exclusionary rule has little or no effect upon the conduct of foreign police.”); 
United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 182 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d sub nom., In re 
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177 (2d. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he deterrent 
rationale of the exclusionary rule, it is posited, has little force with respect to a foreign sovereign.”). 
 130. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 227. 
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All of this is to say that courts’ refusal to apply the principles of 
Miranda to statements that are the product of custodial interrogations by 
foreign officials is misguided. The voluntariness standard that courts 
employ when analyzing such statements permits not only a host of 
nonphysical coercive tactics, but significantly increases the chances that 
statements coerced by torture will be admitted as well. 
Consider United States v. Abu Ali131 and United States v. Marzook.132 
The defendants in both cases credibly claimed that their statements to 
foreign officials were the product of torture. The claims seemed 
plausible, in part, because the governments to which they gave the 
statementsSaudia Arabia and Israelwere widely known to engage in 
torture.133 Indeed, the U.S. State Department has issued reports 
acknowledging as much.134 But neither the Abu Ali nor the Marzook 
court was willing to give any weight to such pattern and practice evidence 
in deciding whether the defendants’ respective statements should be 
suppressed.135 Instead, they focused their attention on a selective 
hodgepodge of factors previously identified by the Supreme Court as 
relevant to the inquiry, while downplaying or ignoring others. Moreover, 
in conducting the voluntariness inquiry, they focused their attention 
almost exclusively on physical, as opposed to psychological, coercion. 
The cases indicate the dangers of allowing courts to make ad hoc 
determinations of voluntariness in terrorism cases. In the absence of 
Miranda’s application to foreign-led interrogations, courts should at least 
subject such interrogations to a level of scrutiny equivalent to that which 
federal courts applied to state confessions prior to incorporation. As 
others have already recognized, they can do so, first, by acknowledging 
credible pattern or practice evidence that suggests a country routinely 
engages in torture,136 and second, by demanding that the U.S. 
government meet a higher evidentiary burden in order to admit the 
statements as proof of guilt at trial.137 
 
 131. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 132. United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 133. See, e.g., High Court of Justice [HCJ] May 26, 1999, 5100 HCJ 94 (Isr.), http://www.btselem.org/ 
download/hc5100_94_19990906_torture_ruling.pdf (finding unconstitutional techniques commonly used by 
Israel General Security Service throughout the 1990s, including use of stress positions and sleep and sensory 
deprivation). 
 134. H.R. Comm. on Int’l Relations & S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong., Rep. on 
Country Human Rights Practices for 2003 (Comm. Print, vol. II, 2004); 2003 Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices, U.S. Dep’t of State, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/index.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 
2016).  
 135. Amnesty Int’l, USA: The Trial of Ahmed Abu AliFindings of Amnesty 
International’s Trial Observation 5 (2005). 
 136. Wadie E. Said, Coercing Voluntariness, 85 Ind. L.J. 1, 46 (2010); Condon, supra note 45, at 
688–89. 
 137. Said, supra note 136, at 46. 
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What stands out about the Abu Ali and Marzook cases, besides the 
allegations of torture, is that in each case the prosecution relied heavily 
on the defendants’ confessions. Ahmad Omar Abu Ali was born in 
Houston, Texas, and raised in Falls Church, Virginia.138 In 2000, Abu Ali 
withdrew from the University of Maryland, where he was a freshman, to 
travel to Saudi Arabia to study Islamic theology.139 While there, he 
allegedly became associated with a group of Islamic radicals, including 
members of Al Qaeda.140 In June of 2003, Saudi officials arrested Abu Ali 
in the aftermath of the previous month’s Riyadh suicide bomb attacks 
that killed nine Americans.141 Abu Ali spent the next forty-seven days in 
incommunicado detention, during which time he was continually 
interrogated by Saudi officials and, according to his testimony, subjected 
to physical torture.142 Upon request, Saudi officials allowed U.S. officials 
to observe one of Abu Ali’s interrogation sessions, at which time they 
asked him American-drafted questions.143 Eventually, Abu Ali made a 
videotaped confession in which he “confess[ed] that he plotted to hijack 
civilian planes and conspired to assassinate President Bush.”144 For 
several months, the U.S. government declined to state why Abu Ali had 
been arrested and whether charges had been or would be filed against 
him.145 That caused his family to file a habeas petition nearly a year after 
his arrest, claiming the U.S. government had orchestrated Abu Ali’s 
incarceration in Saudi Arabia for the purpose of torturing him.146 When 
Judge John D. Bates of the D.C. District Court rejected the government’s 
attempt to dismiss the petition, and ordered the commencement of 
discovery,147 the government suddenly reversed course and produced Abu 
Ali for trial in the Eastern District of Virginia.148 That court ultimately 
rejected Abu Ali’s suppression motion, after which he was tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to thirty years in prison. The Fourth Circuit, 
however, considered the sentence too lenient and remanded for 
resentencing.149 Consequently, Abu Ali was given a life term. 
 
 138. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 139. David Stout, Man Charged in Alleged Plot to Kill President Bush, N.Y. Times (Feb. 22, 2005), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2005/02/22/national/man-charged-in-alleged-plot-to-kill-president-bush.html. 
 140. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 371. 
 143. Id. at 343. 
 144. Condon, supra note 45, at 648. 
 145. Caryle Murphy & John Mintz, Va. Man’s Months in Saudi Prison Go Unexplained, Wash. Post 
(Nov. 22, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/11/22/va-mans-months-in-saudi- 
prison-go-unexplained/327bd225-9907-4d2e-b778-91798013e63b/. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 148. Condon, supra note 45, at 648. 
 149. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that “the district court 
abused its discretion when it compared Abu Ali’s case to those of Lindh and of McVeigh and Nichols, 
respectively, and used those comparisons as a basis for its sentence”). 
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Marzook was an odd case in that it involved the prosecution of a 
man accused of materially supporting Hamas based on statements he had 
given to Israeli security agents more than ten years prior.150 The 
defendant, Muhammad Hamid Khalil Salah, had been arrested at a 
checkpoint between Gaza and Israel on January 25, 1993.151 Israeli 
authorities repeatedly interrogated him for nearly two months.152 Salah 
claimed that his statements were involuntary because they had been 
elicited through torture. He described his conditions of confinement as 
follows: 
[Israeli interrogators] placed a “filthy, foul-smelling hood” over his head, 
handcuffed him behind his back, and forced him to sit in a “slanted child-
sized chair in a position that caused excruciating pain between [his] 
shoulder blades and in [his] back”a technique known in Israel as 
“waiting periods.” While in this position, he claims that he was subjected 
to “deafening music and the sounds of people screaming in pain,” and 
that someone slapped him on his head and face. In addition, Salah claims 
they handcuffed him to a metal bar behind his back in a “dark, freezing, 
closet-sized cell in which [he] could not stand upright, sit or lie down.153 
Although the Israeli interrogators who testified at Salah’s 
suppression hearing acknowledged routinely using such techniques on 
detainees, they claimed not to have done so with Salah because they 
received a directive from the head of the Israel Securities Authority 
instructing them to “treat Muhammad Salah differently than other 
detainees.”154 Based in part on this uncorroborated testimony, the trial 
court ruled the majority of Salah’s statements voluntary and, therefore, 
admissible.155 
It is impossible to know with any certainty, of course, whether Abu 
Ali or Salah’s claims of torture are meritorious. As a general matter, it 
would not be unheard of for a criminal defendant to distort the 
circumstances surrounding his confession, though it is worth noting that, 
even post-trial, both Abu Ali’s and Salah’s lawyers have been steadfast in 
their conviction that their clients were, in fact, tortured.156 But putting to 
the side whether or not the Abu Ali and Marzook courts reached the 
right outcome, the deficiencies of the processes they employed in getting 
there should trouble everyone. 
 
 150. United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 739. 
 154. Id. at 717. 
 155. Id. at 762. 
 156. See, e.g., Michael E. Deutsch & Erica Thompson, Secrets and Lies: The Persecution of Muhammad 
Salah (Part I), 37 J. Palestine Stud. 38, 39 (2008) (noting Salah’s acquittal and describing it as “a victory for 
opponents of torture, government secrecy, and the U.S. government’s uncritical and unconditional support 
for Israel”). 
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Both the Abu Ali and Marzook courts ignored or heavily discounted 
pattern and practice evidence documenting the widespread use of 
coercive techniques by both Saudi Arabian and Israeli intelligence 
agencies. In Abu Ali, the trial court denied defense lawyers the 
opportunity to present evidence concerning “Saudi Arabia’s human 
rights record, its record on torture, and even particularly on the record of 
the Mabahith al-Amma,” the agency that interrogated Abu Ali.157 The 
court would not even permit the testimony of two British witnesses who 
were housed in the same prison as Abu Ali at the time of his 
incarceration, and could presumably speak to the conditions of his 
confinement.158 The Marzook court, by contrast, did permit two defense 
witnesses to testify about Israeli interrogation practices and human rights 
abuses. But, it proceeded to give that testimony almost no weight because 
the witnesses did not personally observe Salah’s interrogations and spoke 
mostly of Israeli treatment of Palestinian, as opposed to American, 
detainees.159 Instead, the court credited the Israeli interrogators’ 
unsubstantiated assertion that Israeli policy prohibited subjecting U.S. 
citizens like Salah to ordinary torture techniques.160 Indeed, the court 
specifically found Salah’s American citizenship to be “significant.”161 The 
court made that finding despite the fact that Salah’s assertions of torture 
were hardly newhe had described them to American consular officials 
on February 12, 1993, eighteen days into his custodial interrogation.162 In 
discounting Salah’s corroborated affidavit, the court placed great 
emphasis on the fact that he had self-reported to consular officials that 
the period in which he was “hooded, tied with his hands behind him and 
forced to sit on a low stool” had lasted only two days.163 
The problematic nature of the voluntariness analysis is underscored 
by the Marzook and Abu Ali courts’ reliance on the lack of physical 
markers to corroborate the defendants’ allegations. Both courts thought 
it highly significant that physical examinations failed to uncover 
definitive evidence of torture. The court’s approach in Abu Ali was, in 
fact, highly disingenuous. Abu Ali’s medical witness testified that he 
observed ten scars on his back in corroboration of Abu Ali’s claims of 
physical torture.164 In contrast, the government presented a dermatologist 
that had never physically examined Abu Ali, but who claimed, based 
entirely on high-resolution photographs, that the markings on Abu Ali’s 
back were not scars, but pigmentation discolorations that “may [have 
 
 157. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 135, at 4. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 760. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 753. 
 162. Id. at 755. 
 163. Id. 
 164. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 375 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
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been] caused by intentional or non-intentional trauma.”165 The court 
nevertheless characterized the suppression hearing as consisting of 
“disparate medical opinions” concerning Abu Ali’s allegations.166 
Ultimately, the court expressed its “reservations” about the diagnosis 
offered by Abu Ali’s physician, and concluded that “[i]n the end, judges, 
not physicians, have to make the ultimate determination of the 
credibility of all of the testimony.” Relying on the testimony of the Saudi 
agents, it found the government had met its burden of proving 
voluntariness.167  
In reviewing Abu Ali and Marzook it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the courts characterized the evidence in such a way as to fit a 
predetermined preference for admissibility. A more charitable reading 
would recognize that determinations of torture are incredibly difficult in 
the absence of definitive physical proof. That is one of the many reasons 
why the voluntariness standard is so troubling. Because ad hoc 
voluntariness inquiries permit courts to consider a hodgepodge of factors 
and assign them whatever weight they wish, decisions over admissibility 
are likely to mirror the policy preferences or prejudices of the individual 
factfinder. Moreover, courts are far removed from the custodial 
interrogation setting. Finding out “what really happened” may be a 
practical impossibility, made no easier for courts by the government’s 
constant invocation of secrecy and defendants’ general unwillingness to 
testify at suppression hearings for fear of subjecting themselves to 
sentencing enhancements should the court find their testimony 
perjurious. Avoiding these difficulties, of course, was precisely the point 
of Miranda. By creating a bright-line rule requiring a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary waiver prior to questioning, the Court hoped to 
avoid so many of the contentious issues that had divided it in the pre-
incorporation era.168 
A fifth, and final, criticism of the Marzook and Abu Ali decisions bears 
mentioning. Within the conversation surrounding torture, it is easy to forget 
that the voluntariness inquiry does not rest on findings of physical coercion. 
In the domestic setting, courts have found confessions involuntary where 
they occurred in circumstances that involved prolonged periods of 
incommunicado detention without charge,169 solitary confinement,170 sleep 
deprivation,171 threats,172 and even promises of leniency.173 By ignoring, or at 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 376.  
 167. Id. at 374. 
 168. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 169. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 227 (1940). 
 170. Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 (1949). 
 171. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961). 
 172. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 560, 567 (1958). 
 173. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 560 (1954). 
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least heavily discounting such factors, the Marzook and Abu Ali courts have 
created an inconsistency in the way voluntariness is measured at home 
compared to abroad. 
B. Interrogations by U.S. Officials 
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide whether the 
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause applies to custodial 
interrogations conducted by U.S. officials abroad. Several lower courts, 
however, have either concluded or assumed that it does.174 Their 
reasoning is primarily based on linguistic differences between the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment’s text. In contrast to the Fourth Amendment’s 
invocation of the term “the people,” which the Court in Verdugo-
Urquidez divined to be a “term of art” referencing some “class of 
persons who are part of a national community,”175 the Fifth Amendment 
speaks more generically of “persons.”176 Perhaps more to the point, the 
Self-Incrimination Clause is frequently spoken of as a “trial right,”177 
meaning violations occur only when testimony is admitted in a domestic 
criminal proceeding. Violations of the Fourth Amendment, by contrast, 
are “‘fully accomplished’ at the time of an unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.”178 Finally, courts have concluded that the policies that support 
Miranda and the Self-Incrimination Clause, described above as 
individual autonomy, deterrence, and reliability, are equally implicated 
when U.S. law enforcement officials interrogate a foreign national 
overseas as they are when those same officials interrogate an American 
citizen in a local stationhouse.179 Taken together, these considerations 
 
 174. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Hassan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Va. 2010); United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 
8 (D.D.C. 2006); United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 175. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 259–60 (1990). 
 176. U.S. Const. amend V. 
 177. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 760 (2003). 
 178. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264. 
 179. Those policies were eloquently described by Justice Goldberg, who Judge Sand cited in his 
Bin Laden opinion: 
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, 
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of 
criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane 
treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by 
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing 
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire 
load; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each 
individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory 
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the guilty, is 
often a protection to the innocent. 
  Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 185; In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 
F.3d 177, 200 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 690 (1998)). 
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have led every court that has considered the issue to conclude that 
Miranda applies to U.S. agencies operating abroad. 
But what exactly does compliance with Miranda mean? Judge 
Leonard Sand offered perhaps the most robust version of Miranda’s 
application overseas in evaluating the confession of Mohamed Rasheed 
Daoud al-Owhali, a Saudi national accused, and eventually convicted of, 
participating in the 1998 Nairobi Embassy bombing. In the aftermath of 
the bombing, al-Owhali had been picked up by FBI agents and their 
Kenyan counterparts and questioned for nearly two weeks before finally 
confessing.180 According to the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted 
him, “[w]ithout the confession, it is highly unlikely there would have 
been a case against him.”181 FBI agents had, in fact, Mirandized al-Owhali 
in Kenya. But, they had modified the right-to-counsel portion of the 
warnings to read: 
In the United States, you would have the right to talk to a lawyer to get 
advice before we ask you any questions and you could have a lawyer 
with you during questioning. In the United States, if you could not 
afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for you, if you wish, before 
any questioning. Because we are not in the United States, we cannot 
ensure that you will have a lawyer appointed for you before any 
questioning.182 
The court was therefore faced with two questions: (1) does Miranda 
apply abroad to custodial interrogations conducted by FBI agents; and 
(2) must a suspect be informed that he has the right to counsel if the host 
country does not provide such counsel as a matter of right? 
Judge Sand swiftly dismissed the government’s argument that al-
Owhali had no Fifth Amendment rights because his only connection to 
the United States was his desire to attack it.183 In addition to the reasons 
listed above, Judge Sand noted that the Supreme Court had previously 
held the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applicable to both 
resident and nonresident aliens.184 As to the second question, Judge Sand 
found the modified warnings wanting. He began by recognizing that U.S. 
agents could not “compel a foreign sovereign to accept blind allegiance 
to American criminal procedure, at least when U.S. involvement in the 
foreign investigation is limited to mutual cooperation.”185 But, “to the 
maximum extent reasonably possible,” U.S. officials should be required 
to make efforts “to replicate what rights would be present if the 
 
 180. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 174–75. 
 181. Andrew C. McCarthy, The Global Fifth Amendment: Obama Goes to Court, Part II: Miranda 
Meets Al-Qaeda, Nat’l Review (June 16, 2009), http://www.nationalreview.com/node/227705/print. 
 182. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 180. 
 183. Id. at 181. 
 184. Id. at 183 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 873 
(1985)). 
 185. Id. at 188. 
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interrogation were being conducted in America.”186 In this regard, Judge 
Sand believed al-Owhali’s interrogators had failed.187 He found that the 
advice-of-rights form presented to the defendant wrongly conveyed to al-
Owhali that, “due to his custodial situs outside the United States, he 
currently possesse[d] no opportunity to avail himself of the services of an 
attorney before or during questioning by U.S. officials.”188 In fact, there 
was some evidence that, had U.S. officials inquired into the possibility of 
locating counsel for al-Owhali, Kenyan authorities might have 
complied.189 
Judge Sand’s opinion has been subjected to attack from all quarters. 
There are those who believe the opinion did not go far enough in 
recognizing the indispensability of a suspect’s right to speak with counsel 
before submitting to custodial interrogation.190 To Judge Sand’s critics it 
seems inconceivable that the scope of a suspect’s right against self-
incrimination could turn on the vagaries of foreign law.191 On the other 
hand, Judge Sand himself eventually backpedaled from his original 
decision to exclude al-Owhali’s statements, perhaps cognizant of the fact 
that suppression would have effectively ended the government’s case.192 
Judge Sand maintained the contention that U.S. authorities have an 
obligation to familiarize themselves with local law and comply with 
Miranda to the fullest extent possible, but he ultimately found al-
Owhali’s statements admissible on the alternative grounds that one of 
the FBI agents had orally advised him of his right to an attorney.193 One 
wonders whether Judge Sand’s opinion, which was issued in 2000, would 
have looked the same had it been written after the events of September 
11th. 
When the Second Circuit eventually got around to reviewing Judge 
Sand’s decision eight years later, it rejected his reasoning.194 The court, 
while noting that Miranda’s “deterrence rationale retains its force” in the 
international setting as applied to U.S. agents, nonetheless refused to 
even confirm Judge Sand’s assessment that Miranda applies abroad.195 
Instead, the Second Circuit chose to critique his reasoning while simply 
assuming that Miranda “might” apply extraterritorially.196 In contrast to 
Judge Sand’s skepticism over the advice-of-rights form, the Second 
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Circuit was far more forgiving of the agents’ efforts to comply with the 
law. According to the court, U.S. law enforcement personnel need only 
make “an honest, good faith effort to provide accurate information,” not 
“advocate on behalf of suspects.”197 The Second Circuit further noted 
that Miranda had previously been “applied in a flexible fashion to 
accommodate the exigencies of local conditions.”198 The Court relied in 
particular on Duckworth v. Eagan, a decision that upheld a state warning 
that accurately informed criminal suspects that they had the right to 
speak with an attorney, but that they would only be provided one “if and 
when” they went to court.199 The Second Circuit was also apparently 
worried about the burden that Judge Sand’s opinion would have on law 
enforcement officers operating overseas. In the court’s words, “U.S. 
agents acting overseas need not become experts in foreign criminal 
procedure in order to comply with Miranda.”200 
Although problematic in that it does not recognize Miranda’s 
applicability abroad, the Second Circuit’s criticism of Judge Sand’s 
decision is hard to disagree with. The agents in al-Owhali appear to have 
made a good faith effort to comply with Miranda, and took care not to 
mislead al-Owhali as to the nature of his rights. Judge Sand also appears 
to have gone too far in requiring FBI agents to familiarize themselves 
with the local laws of whatever jurisdiction they happen to be operating 
in at any given time. It is true that since the African embassy bombings, 
the number of FBI attaché offices have expanded exponentially.201 But, 
the character of the working relationship between Kenya and the U.S. 
intelligence communities at the time of al-Owhali’s arrest is less clear. In 
any event, Judge Sand’s opinion appears to too easily disregard 
incentives. The harder you make it for U.S. officials to comply with 
Miranda, the more likely they are to defer to the parallel system of 
largely unregulated, foreign-led interrogations. 
This brings up a more troubling reality that the Second Circuit 
raised, but did not resolve: 
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We are aware that, as defendants urge, foreign detainees may run the 
risk of refusing to speak to U.S. officials only to find themselves forced to 
speak to their foreign jailors. This would be so, however, even if U.S. 
agents made efforts to secure counsel on their behalf and those efforts 
proved fruitless. The risk of being forced to speak to their foreign jailors 
would also exist, moreover, if U.S. agents were not involved at all. Of 
course, statements obtained under these circumstances could not be 
admitted in a U.S. trial if the situation indicated that the statements were 
made involuntarily.202 
That last statement largely misses the mark given the relatively low 
bar that the voluntariness threshold poses for the admission of 
internationally obtained confessions. But the Court, perhaps unwittingly, 
spoke to the real problem: What choice does a suspect have but to talk to 
U.S. officials when he is detained in a foreign jail in some third world 
country? 
Although a lot of academic commentary has been devoted to Judge 
Sand’s decision and the Second Circuit’s follow-up, neither opinion really 
speaks to the actual coercion that suspects experience in foreign custody. 
Even if some form of Miranda warnings are required, that will hardly solve 
the problem of coerced statements abroad. That is because the U.S. 
government has exploited certain loopholes in the Miranda warnings/waiver 
framework. Those loopholes are the subject of Part III of this Article. 
 
III.  Circumventing MIRANDA 
A. Joint Ventures 
As has been made clear at this point, a major disconnect exists in 
the law of coerced confessions. Miranda, in some form at least, appears 
to apply to the actions of U.S. law enforcement abroad. But, statements 
elicited by foreign officials are governed by a much looser voluntariness 
standard. While some might hope for district courts to more stringently 
enforce the voluntariness standard by, say, increasing the evidentiary 
burden for admission or acknowledging pattern and practice evidence, 
such hopes do not appear realistic. The problem is that the voluntariness 
standard too easily lends itself to judicial policy preferences masquerading 
as law. 
So long as U.S. courts view interrogations in a binary U.S./non-U.S. 
manner, the law of coerced confessions is likely to provide little protection 
to criminal defendants who have the misfortune of being questioned 
overseas. Moreover, if U.S. courts insist on Miranda’s application 
whenever U.S. officials engage in questioning, it is likely there will be an 
acceleration in the outsourcing of interrogations to foreign governments. 
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The joint venture doctrine offers a readymade way out of the 
morass, but I am skeptical that courts will embrace its lessons. After all, 
that doctrine was fashioned in the context of Prohibition. One need not 
be a full-fledged legal realist to understand that courts are likely to view 
the threat of bathtub gin differently than that of improvised explosive 
devices. In the pre-incorporation era, skeptical federal courts seemed 
principally concerned with ensuring federal officials did not circumvent 
constitutional safeguards. By contrast, those same courts today display 
an eager willingness to defer to national security concerns of which they 
know little and, consequently, are more worried about freeing federal 
officials from constitutional restraints than using those restraints to bind 
them. 
Abu Ali provides a case in point. The level of Saudi-U.S. cooperation 
remains something of a mystery because the U.S. government repeatedly 
invoked national security as a basis for denying both the court and defense 
counsel access to information about the nature of the relationship. We do 
know, however, that Saudi officials granted a U.S. government request to 
attend one of Abu Ali’s interrogations.203 At that same interrogation, Saudi 
agents asked Abu Ali six of thirteen questions prepared by American 
intelligence officials.204 It is not clear why Saudi officials omitted the other 
seven questions. In any event, Abu Ali moved to suppress his statements 
during that interrogation session on the basis of joint venture. The district 
court denied his request. 
Interestingly, joint venture is the only issue that divided the Fourth 
Circuit when it decided Abu Ali’s appeal. Judges Traxler and Wilkinson 
found no evidence of joint venture, which they recast as a doctrine 
requiring “a significant degree of investigative control or authority.”205 
The court found it highly significant, for instance, that the Saudis refused 
to ask seven of the thirteen questions posed by American intelligence 
officials, a “majority” as the court pointed out.206 Judge Motz countered 
by pointing out that such formalism would provide easy cover for U.S. 
and foreign governments to circumvent Miranda.207 
Judges Traxler and Wilkinson, however, went on to forthrightly 
acknowledge the policy considerations motivating their position. First, 
adopting a more stringent joint venture doctrine would “contravene the 
well-established notion that Miranda, which is intended to regulate only 
the conduct of American law enforcement officers, does not apply 
extraterritorially to foreign officials absent significant involvement by 
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American law enforcement.”208 Never mind that this begs the question of 
what “significant involvement” means. For Judge Motz, the significant 
level of U.S. involvement in Abu Ali’s interrogation was not difficult to 
discern: “Whatever else ‘active’ or ‘substantial’ participation may mean, 
when United States law enforcement officials propose the questions 
propounded by foreign law enforcement officials, and those questions 
are asked in the presence of, and in consultation with United States law 
enforcement officials, this must constitute ‘active’ or ‘substantial’ 
participation.”209 
The second concern held by Judges Traxler and Wilkinson’s was 
that “a broad per se holding could potentially discourage the United 
States and its allies from cooperating in criminal investigations of an 
international scope.”210 While perhaps true, the judges put forward no 
explanation for how such a concern related to their duty to pass on the 
constitutional rights of criminal suspects. Indeed, this was precisely the 
type of argument thrust upon the Supreme Court in its pre-incorporation 
joint venture cases, one that it flatlyand repeatedlyrejected as 
inconsistent with its duty to speak to individual rights.211 In any event, it 
seems hyperbolic to suggest that cooperation between U.S. and foreign 
law enforcement agencies will come to a grinding halt simply because 
foreign officials are required to Mirandize suspects prior to asking them 
questions posed by the United States. 
B. Two-Step Interrogations 
In November 2009, agents of the Nigerian State Security Service 
arrested Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed, a Swedish permanent resident of 
Eritrean dissent.212 Ahmed subsequently pled guilty to providing material 
support to al-Shabaab, a militant Islamic organization.213 Prior to his 
guilty plea, Ahmed faced more serious charges and sought to suppress 
various statements he had made to Nigerian and U.S. officials. I was a 
member of Ahmed’s defense team while in law school and helped draft 
the post-hearing brief in support of his motion to suppress. 
As recounted in our brief, Ahmed alleged that Nigerian officials had 
held him incommunicado for over 100 days without charging him with a 
crime or bringing him before a Nigerian court.214 During the period of his 
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confinement, Nigerian and American officials allegedly interrogated him 
no fewer than nineteen times.215 Ahmed further alleged that his Nigerian 
jailers had denied him access to an attorney, his family, or Swedish 
consular officials.216 
The U.S. Government subsequently sought to introduce statements it 
had procured from Ahmed as part of a deliberate two-step interrogation 
strategy. In December 2009, American officials received permission from 
their Nigerian counterparts to interrogate Ahmed.217 Prior to the initial 
interrogation, those same officials devised a two-step interrogation plan 
admittedly designed to evade the requirements of Miranda. The plan 
involved a so-called “dirty” interrogation in which U.S. interrogators 
purposefully avoided administering Miranda warnings so that Ahmed 
would more freely “confess,” followed by the insertion of a second team of 
interrogators to purportedly “clean” Ahmed’s prior statements of their 
taint so they could be used against him in a criminal trial.218 Ahmed was 
never informed by the “clean” team of the inadmissibility of his prior 
statements or the reason for the two interrogations. 
The same tactic has been used on other foreign detainees. The 
Obama administration has increasingly favored a hybrid model of 
detention in which terrorism suspects are temporarily detained on naval 
ships before being brought to the United States. This occurred with both 
Ahmed Abdulkhadir Warsame and Abu Anas al-Libi.219 In Warsame’s 
case, a “dirty” team interrogated him for two months before providing 
him with Miranda warnings.220 Al-Libi’s interrogation lasted a shorter 
time only because he had hepatitis C and U.S. officials were concerned 
about his declining health.221 
Ahmed moved to suppress the statements obtained by U.S. 
interrogators as the product of an illicit two-step interrogation under the 
Supreme Court’s 2004 holding in Missouri v. Seibert.222 The district court 
never reached the merits of Ahmed’s motion, however, because Ahmed 
ultimately accepted a plea deal that permitted him to serve less than ten 
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years in prison.223 Absent the deal, Ahmed would have faced a potential 
life sentence if convicted. 
While we do not know how the district court would have ruled, the 
facts of Ahmed’s case tell us much about how the government is 
conducting the war on terror with one eye on the prospective admissibility 
of confessions and one eye on intelligence gathering. The government 
claimed that it had not violated Ahmed’s rights, and Seibert was not 
applicable because the sole purpose of the unwarned interrogation had 
been to procure intelligence information.224 
If Ahmed had not accepted a plea deal, the admissibility of his 
confession would have turned on an interpretation of Seibert, a case that 
produced no majority opinion. A brief review of Seibert’s facts may 
prove helpful. The defendant in Seibert was believed to be involved in 
the murder of her twelve-year-old, physically handicapped son.225 The 
arresting officer’s superior instructed him to refrain from administering 
Miranda warnings pursuant to the department’s question-first interrogation 
policy.226 During the subsequent un-Mirandized interrogation, the defendant 
implicated herself in her son’s murder.227 After providing her with a brief 
twenty-minute break, the officer administered Miranda warnings and 
obtained a signed waiver of rights.228 At no time did he inform the 
defendant that her prior statements were inadmissible. During this 
second interrogation, she proceeded to repeat her prior, un-Mirandized 
statements.229 
Seibert provided the Court with an opportunity to revisit the holding 
of an earlier case, Oregon v. Elstad.230 The Elstad Court had declined to 
rule a Mirandized confession inadmissible where it had been preceded by 
a Miranda violation. Elstad’s holding, in favor of admissibility, may fairly 
be characterized as resting on the unintentional nature of the Miranda 
violation at issue in that case.231 The initial Miranda violation in Elstad 
occurred at the time of the defendant’s arrest, rather than in a formal 
custodial interrogation setting. Officers had gone to the defendant’s 
home with the intention of executing an arrest warrant.232 When they 
arrived, the officers made “a brief stop in the living room” where one 
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spoke with the defendant who made an incriminating admission.233 The 
purpose of the arresting officers’ stop in the living room “was not to 
interrogate the suspect but to notify his mother of the reason for his 
arrest.”234 The officers’ failure to administer Miranda warnings was not 
deliberate, but rather an “oversight” that “may have been the result of 
confusion as to whether the brief exchange qualified as ‘custodial 
interrogation’ . . . .”235 The Elstad Court was careful to limit the scope of its 
holding by noting “that, absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in 
obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an 
unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion.”236 
Indeed, the Court rejected as unfounded Justice Brennan’s concern that 
the Court’s opinion served to validate question-first interrogation tactics. 
Brennan’s criticism, the majority wrote, “distorts the reasoning and 
holding of our decision, but, worse, invites trial courts and prosecutors to 
do the same.”237 
In Seibert, Justice Kennedy began his enigmatic concurrence by 
noting that the “scope of the Miranda suppression remedy depends . . . 
on whether admission of the evidence under the circumstances would 
frustrate Miranda’s central concerns and objectives.”238 He understood 
Miranda’s goals to be deterrence of police misconduct and assurance of 
the reliability of confessions.239 Accordingly, there is some reason to 
believe Justice Kennedy’s primary concern was differentiating 
unintentional Miranda violations from intentional ones.240 
But, Justice Kennedy disregarded the plurality’s invocation of an 
objective test that would have treated all violations of Miranda similarly. 
Instead, he endorsed a “narrower test applicable only in the infrequent 
case . . . in which the two-step interrogation technique was used in a 
calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.”241 The government, 
therefore, argued that Seibert was irrelevant where the purpose of the 
unwarned interrogation was to gather intelligence information, not 
statements admissible for prosecution.242 Such an argument is at least 
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s view that the Seibert technique was 
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problematic because it did not “serve any legitimate objectives that 
might otherwise justify its use.”243 One could readily argue, as the 
government did, that intelligence gathering is a “legitimate objective.” 
The foregoing discussion is merely intended to highlight another 
method the government has used to circumvent Miranda in the terrorism 
context. Unlike the other techniques discussed herein, two-step 
interrogations have yet to receive judicial sanction. But, given Justice 
Kennedy’s ambiguous concurrence, it may not be too long before Article 
III courts give their judicial blessing. 
Conclusion 
This Article serves as a wake-up call to those who sing the praises of 
Article III courts. If commentators continue to focus on those courts’ 
virtues, without considering their vices, we are doomed to witness 
profound changes to our criminal procedure law, not just for terrorists, 
but for all persons charged with criminal offenses. 
Government lawyers have spent much of the last decade developing 
methods to circumvent Mirandadeferring to foreign governments, 
devising two-step interrogation techniques, and expanding the public 
safety exception. Opinions written by conservative judges hostile to 
Miranda’s theory of custodial interrogations have provided them with 
the ammunition to accomplish this task. The project may be too far 
underway to reverse the tide. But all hope is not lost. We have endured 
darker periods in our history only to emerge as a stronger and wiser 
nation. Let us hope that the current administration’s commitment to 
ending incommunicado detention and trying terrorism suspects in Article 
III courts is real and immediate. But let us also hope that a few judges of 
sturdy character will have the courage to stand up for what the 
Constitution demands. 
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